Australia's perspectives on trilateral security cooperation in the Western Pacific

Kokoda Foundation Australia-US-Japan trilateral seminar dinner

Speech, check against delivery

Canberra

18 November 2010

Thank you to Ross Babbage and the Kokoda Foundation for inviting me once again to address your annual seminar-dinner.

This Foundation takes its name and inspiration from one of the most dramatic events, and resonant symbols, of Australia's life as a nation.

Some of you may know that I walked the 93 kilometres of the Kokoda Track some years ago.

I have just a little appreciation of just how tough the conditions were and how high the stakes were in 1942.

Evoking, as it does, Australian defiance and determination, the name Kokoda is fitting for an organisation that develops thinkers and thinking on Australia's future security challenges.

Already in just six years the Kokoda Foundation has made a major contribution, through the annual Australia-United States strategic dialogue.

And through a program whose aims are dear to my heart, the Young Strategic Leaders Forum.

This Forum seeks to foster the next generation of Australian national security leaders and thinkers.

It offers them exposure early in their career to the thoughts and realities of practitioners in government, industry and academia and helps build a sense of esprit de corps.

Earlier this year I was pleased to open the National Security College. This institution was born out of the conviction that Australia needed a national security community and culture with a common conceptual framework, a common language.

In the world of the 21st century our national security practitioners must break down the silos of departments, business and academia.

They must access different networks of knowledge.

They must bring their practice of public policy into active engagement with other policy-makers and scholars of different backgrounds and expertise.

And so I am encouraged by the important work that Kokoda is doing to help build a national security community.

I am delighted that for this year's seminar and workshop, Kokoda has broadened its invitation list beyond participants from the United States and Australia to include for the first time participants from Japan.

I am delighted because former adversaries on the Kokoda Track have now become our fellow travellers.

And I am pleased because their involvement greatly deepens the conversation we can have about security in the Western Pacific, backing up the important first-track talks the three governments have including in the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue.

When we look at the Western Pacific we see a region in which fast and differential economic growth is changing relative economic power.

Over the period from 1990 to 2015, the IMF predicts that the United States economy will have grown three-fold to US$18 trillion, with its share of global output falling slightly from 26.2 per cent to 22.0 per cent.

In the same 25 year period, the IMF predicts that China will have grown its economy 25-fold, to just under US$10 trillion: put another way, from 1.8 per cent of global output to 12.2 per cent.

Over the same period, Japan's economy is predicted to have grown from US$3 trillion to US$6.5 trillion - as a share of global output, a fall from 13.7 per cent to 8.0 per cent.

Korea's share of world output is predicted to rise from 1.2 to 1.7 per cent; India's from 1.5 to 2.9 per cent; Australia's from 1.5 to 1.8 per cent.

The proportion of the contribution to global output of East Asia – the countries of North Asia plus ASEAN – is predicted to rise from 19.4 per cent in 1990 to 26.3 per cent in 2015.

So in 2015, the United States will still be by far the world's largest economy, and likely to remain so until the 2030s.

But, in aggregate, the economic weight of East Asia, by early this decade, will be greater than that of the United States.

With the economic rise of the region come other dynamics.

Many of the countries in the region are becoming richer. Their populations are becoming better informed and more articulate. They are gaining confidence.

They are looking not only to grow, but also to protect what they have: in short they are beginning to flex their muscles.

Military expenditure is one of these areas in which things are just beginning to change.

The relativities in this field are shifting much, much more slowly, but a new trajectory is emerging.

The United States is still the unchallenged leader and will be for many decades to come.

Its military expenditure (according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)) was US$663 billion in 2009, an increase of 25 per cent on its 1989 expenditure.

East Asia's 2009 military spend, at US$208 billion, was a 122 per cent increase on 1989.

The US military spend in 1989 was six times that of East Asia, now it is three times that of East Asia.

And the growth rate in East Asia, albeit of a much lower base, has been much more rapid than for the US.

China's military expenditure grew by 600 per cent to US$99 billion over the 20 year period compared with a 122 per cent increase for the region as a whole.

My point is that the region is experiencing a period of great dynamism.

The colossal wealth and power of the United States is not waning, but East Asia as a region is starting to catch up.

This will change strategic realities now and in the decades ahead.

This is the inevitable product of faster economic growth.

As the numbers make clear, China will have been responsible for a little over half (56 per cent) of East Asia's economic growth in absolute terms in the 25 years to 2015.

China's rapid economic development has helped lift around 500 million people out of poverty.

This is an unambiguously good thing.

And Australia has benefited: the robust growth in China provides strong support to Australia's economy.

Military modernisation is a natural part of any country's economic development; China is no different in this respect.

As we said openly in the 2009 Defence White Paper, we encourage China to be open and transparent as it undergoes its military modernisation program; this will help reduce concerns in the region.

So the region's new strategic complexity derives from the region's economic success.

Through this prism, it is arguably a good problem to have.

And yet our region remains one in which there are serious security problems, deep strategic uncertainties, many of which are long-standing.

We have a surprisingly large number of outstanding territorial disputes: in the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and between Russia and Japan over the Northern Territories.

We still have tensions over the Taiwan Strait.

We have a nervous truce on the Korean Peninsula holding the huge military forces confronting each other on either side of the 38th Parallel.

In recent times, some of these long-standing tough security issues have come to the fore once more.

The sinking of the ROK navy ship the Cheonan in March this year highlighted again the brittle nature of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

Australia condemned the DPRK for this violent act.

We still do.

This was outrageous, destabilizing behaviour by a regime with little commitment to the peace and stability of the region.

Lasting security on the Peninsula will only be realised through open communication and peaceful cooperation, not through isolation and provocation.

In the East China Sea the 7 September maritime collisions in disputed waters increased tensions between Japan and China.

And earlier this year Chinese policy towards the South China Sea caused concern among other claimant states in the region.

Australia does not have a position on these territorial disputes.

We do not take a position on any individual country's claims.

But we do have an interest in such differences being handled peacefully, in accordance with international law, and in a way that does not allow nationalist sentiments to exacerbate tension in our region.

We have an interest in peace and stability, freedom of navigation, respect for international law, unimpeded lawful commerce, and application of the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

There is a clear need for this to be the basis for a peaceful resolution of regional maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, as well as the East China Sea.

We would support negotiation of a more formal, binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.

In addition to these old traditional or so-called ‘hard' security challenges, our region will also increasingly face a range of newer non-traditional security threats:

So we are in a region that has witnessed unparalleled growth in economy and prosperity in recent decades.

And yet we have left unanswered many tough security questions, even as new ones emerge.

There is a significant risk to our economic success if we leave old disputes unresolved.

We need a new generation of creative diplomacy to manage and resolve them.

What all players in the region would acknowledge is that we need the security and stability that has underpinned the phenomenal growth of the last 40 years to be sustained for the next 40 also.

What are the principles that will help us deliver that?

The first is to remind ourselves of what has been the foundation of peace and stability in the region.

A foundation that has made possible the phenomenal economic growth and prosperity that we have built.

That is strong US strategic engagement in the region for close to seven decades.

This colloquium comes just after the talks Stephen Smith and myself held with Secretary of State Clinton and Defense Secretary Gates in Melbourne last week.

Those talks marked the 25th anniversary of AUSMIN and the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our nations.

Next year we mark the 60th anniversary of the signing of the ANZUS treaty, the underpinning of the US-Australia Alliance.

AUSMIN focussed our minds again on the enduring value of this Alliance, America's network of alliances in the Western Pacific, and of US engagement here more broadly.

It reminded us of our continuing and common values and the ability of the Alliance to deal with global and regional challenges and emerging 21st century threats and opportunities.

Australia believes that the future strategic stability of the region will in large part rely on the continuing strong presence and engagement of the United States, which the Obama Administration has made a high priority.

A second principle is for Japan to play a regional and global role commensurate with its economic strength, capability, and interests.

Japan is and will remain a global power.

It has vast economic and technical capacity.

It has a commitment to regional and global peace and stability.

It has made great contributions to diplomatic, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations around the world.

It aspires to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, an aspiration Australia fully supports, as we do for India.

Australia would support, and seeks to encourage Japan to play, an even greater role in regional and global strategic affairs.

Japan has played a key role in developing the region's architecture.

It had a foundational role in the establishment of APEC and a crucial role in the development of the East Asia Summit.

Japan has been so involved because it recognises, as does Australia, the importance of a third principle I want to stress: the need to get the regional architecture right.

One of the core challenges of the 21st century is for Australia, Japan, the United States and other allies in the region, together with China, to work together to frame a common sense of rules-based security cooperation in our region.

One of the things that will develop this common sense is a stronger regional architecture that affords the right opportunities for dialogue and the culture and habits of cooperation to deliver that.

That regional architecture is now in better shape than it was just a year ago to meet contemporary challenges.

We needed to expand the East Asia Summit to include the United States and Russia so that:

This was our core objective in floating the idea of an Asia-Pacific community – as I said in a speech on the APc to regional representatives in December last year – a regional institution with sufficient membership and mandate, and meeting at summit level to begin to carve out a regional rules based order for the future.

In October, with the EAS' expansion, we achieved that objective.

APEC will remain a vital regional forum for trade and investment liberalisation and structural economic reform "behind the borders".

Following Japan's successful year as chair, Australia is confident that the United States' year in the chair will further deliver on that agenda.

A fourth and final principle, to which all the others need to and do work, is entrenching a rules-based regional and global order.

As is clear from the list of enduring and emerging security challenges I have outlined, it is vitally important that the countries of our region work individually and collectively to clarify rights and responsibilities.

To develop strong norms of international behaviour and to establish confidence in our security-building measures.

Australia would very much like to see China contribute to this emerging regional dialogue and the development of a regional rules-based order for us all.

Measured against these principles, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) which Australia, Japan and the United States established in 2001 has demonstrated it is a valuable component of regional cooperation.

Australia, the United States and Japan have much in common.

We are all large open economies.

We are stable democracies.

And we share deep security interests.

Each of us is committed to strengthening a regional and global rules-based order.

Japan and Australia share a fundamental interest in strengthening continued US engagement in the western Pacific as a key element of regional stability.

The TSD provides a mechanism for the United States' two closest Asia-Pacific allies to share perspectives with the United States on the challenges facing our region, and increase our cooperation across a wide range of activities.

Supporting continued US engagement in the region does not simply mean sticking rigidly to old models.

This is a dynamic enterprise, and the TSD's evolution has been a part of this.

The TSD is not an alliance.

Nor is it designed to respond to any single security challenge.

Indeed, Australia believes that by enhancing dialogue regionally through the emerging institution of the EAS, existing architecture, and through enhancing dialogue one-on-one with China, we can obtain greater predictability, consistency and stability on security issues than before.

The TSD has also provided a valuable further stimulus to strengthen the Australia-Japan leg of the TSD triangle to complement the depth and strength of our cooperation with the United States.

Australia and Japan enjoy a comprehensive partnership. In the past decade, security cooperation has grown rapidly.

The 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation established a 2+2 meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers.

In 2009, an updated Action Plan was agreed to give impetus to the Joint Declaration.

This is one of only three such meetings Australia has worldwide.

In May 2010 we signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement that will help us develop the interoperability of our defence forces.

And we are negotiating a treaty on information security to provide a legal framework to allow us to share more information.

A cornerstone of the Australia-Japan friendship has always been our shared commitment to pursuing a world free of nuclear weapons.

That was why our two nations established the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament in 2008.

Why we followed that body's work by releasing early this year a joint statement outlining the first steps on a path to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

And why we tabled at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May a package of practical disarmament and non-proliferation measures.

Japan and Australia are now jointly chairing a new cross-regional grouping with other like-minded nations from across the traditional blocks to find common ground and develop practical solutions to overcome the current divides in non-proliferation and disarmament.

And drive implementation of the sixty-four recommendations agreed by consensus at the Review Conference.

As the Australia-Japan security relationship expands, opportunities to expand the scope of trilateral cooperation will also grow.

The TSD complements and supports good regional architecture; it does not cut across the broader regional architecture.

It is appropriate and necessary that there will be more discrete security bodies in the region, in some of which Australia is not involved.

It is appropriate that there are trilateral summits among Japan, ROK and China.

It is appropriate that there is the Six Party Talks mechanism to engage in the dialogue with North Korea necessary to achieve a long-term solution to the nuclear problem on the Peninsula – so long as North Korea demonstrates a commitment to denuclearisation.

It is appropriate that there be a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation involving particularly Central Asia.

We do not have a problem with the evolution of these bodies that complement region-wide architecture; indeed we welcome those habits of cooperation.

Next year at a mutually-convenient time I will be hosting the next TSD Ministerial Meeting, the first since I took up the post of Foreign Minister.

It is therefore appropriate that I reflect for a moment on the future of the TSD.

First, it is clear to me that the TSD has proven itself a grouping that delivers great value to its members.

One of its strengths is its flexibility.

The TSD has no formal organisational structure, rules, or secretariat.

There are no fixed timetables for meetings – we meet as convenient opportunities present themselves.

It is responsive to the needs of the partners, with working groups or forums being stood up as required and phased out when no longer needed.

In addition to the high-level policy dialogue at Ministerial level and Senior Officials Meetings, a range of trilateral consultative mechanisms at officials' level have developed under the auspices of the TSD.

They have covered topics as diverse as counter-terrorism cooperation, non-proliferation, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

There has been speculation about the TSD growing to include additional members.

I am not attracted to the idea of growing the TSD.

One of the great strengths of the TSD is that it brings together countries with uniquely similar interests and perspectives, and I would not want to see that diluted.

This is not to say that there are not some functional issues on which TSD partners might not have an interest in working with other countries.

But this should be explored carefully and in a way which does not compromise the unique characteristics of the TSD.

I would expect that the next few years will see increasing cooperation between TSD partners as a natural consequence of our close relationship.

Practical trilateral cooperation between our defence ministries and militaries has already expanded through the Security and Defence Cooperation Forum.

I would expect to more joint exercises between our militaries.

And I would envisage even closer cooperation to meet the challenges of terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

As an example of practical cooperation under the TSD, next month Australia will host TSD Counter-Terrorism consultations in Melbourne, led by Counter-Terrorism Ambassadors from all three countries.

The meeting will agree joint projects to strengthen counter-terrorism capabilities in the region.

I would hope that in future we will build procedures and practices that will result in trilateral partners instinctively turning to each other to coordinate and cooperate in response to disasters in the region.

Earlier this year Australia led a trilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief desktop exercise in which the three countries explored how they might coordinate and cooperate in their emergency response to a natural disaster in the region.

The exercise demonstrated the value of close coordination among three key first-responders and aid donors in the region, both in the immediate aftermath, but also, importantly, in the subsequent reconstruction phase.

As a flexible and responsive mechanism, I would also foresee the TSD taking up emerging security challenges, such as developing international norms on space security, and perhaps giving attention to non-traditional security challenges like cyber security and the security aspects of climate change.

Space is emerging as a new arena for strategic competition. Space-based systems are not only important defence assets – they also are critical infrastructure supporting our economy and way of life.

At AUSMIN, Australia and the United States expressed concern about the development and testing of counter-space weapons which can disrupt or destroy critical satellites and create space debris to even greater effect.

We committed to work together to develop effective and verifiable arms control measures to meet these challenges, focussing initially on transparency and confidence-building measures, and non-binding "rules of the road".

Japan is a major space-faring nation and we already have growing space cooperation with Japan, epitomised by the recent successful completion of the Hayabusa mission.

Japanese scientists confirmed this week that the Hayabusa spacecraft, which landed in Woomera on 13 June 2010, brought back around 1,500 particles from the Itokowa asteroid.

This is the first time materials from an asteroid in the far reaches of space have been directly recovered.

Japan shares our interest in free and safe access to space, so space security could conceivably be a future focus of TSD work.

Trilateral cooperation among Australia, Japan and the United States and the TSD itself reflect the common determination of our three nations to help shape an Asia-Pacific region that is stable and peaceful, whose security and prosperity is assured.

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