Speech
to the Second Korea-Australasia Research Centre International
Symposium
Sydney, 12 June 2002
The Inter-Korean Relationship in the Post September 11 Environment:
An Asia-Pacific Regional Perspective
Introduction
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.
Thank you for your welcome. I am delighted to be able to return to
speak again at this second Symposium being organised by the Korea-Australasia
Research Centre, in partnership with the Asia-Australia Institute.
Establishing the Centre in 2000 was an important initiative, and
I commend the Korea Research Foundation and the University of New
South Wales for supporting it. I welcome especially today the
presence of Mr Jae Kyu Park, the distinguished former Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister for Unification of the Republic of Korea.
Regional stability and the Korean Peninsula
Today’s address gives me the opportunity to underline Australia's
ongoing commitment to the closest possible engagement with our region,
and with the Korean Peninsula in particular.
The Korean Peninsula is among the most serious potential flashpoints
in our region – alongside relations across the Taiwan Strait,
disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea and, more widely
and most prescient, the state of the dispute over Kashmir.
Security and stability on the Korean Peninsula go to the heart of
Australia's strategic interests. Put simply, the consequences
of a security breakdown on the Korean Peninsula would be immense,
not only for the immediate region of North East Asia, but for Australia
as well.
The strategic engagement of the United States in the Asia-Pacific
is the key stabilising influence in our region – a fact recognised
by all. In short, US engagement underpins the stability and
prosperity of the region – as it has for the last fifty years.
The US presence on the Korean Peninsula, of course, is a critical
component of that wider regional engagement – of which Australia’s
security alliance with the United States, ANZUS, is another part.
Our policy approach for the Korean Peninsula, therefore, is twofold.
First, we support the alliance between the Republic of Korea and the
United States, and the US forward deployment in South Korea.
We also strongly support the1994 US-DPRK Framework Agreement, which
aims to achieve peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
These are the key deterrents to military adventurism on the Peninsula.
The second part of our policy approach is strong support for diplomatic,
humanitarian, political and economic engagement between the two Koreas,
as well as directly with the two Koreas.
Our relationship with South Korea, of course, is warm, strong and
longstanding – the ROK is now our fourth largest trading partner,
and third largest export market, for example. In addition to
our strong economic ties, we enjoy growing cooperation with South
Korea in a wide range of regional and multilateral forums.
Our relationship with North Korea, for many reasons, is much more
tenuous, though – as I shall explain – entering a new
phase.
Recent developments on the Korean Peninsula
It is timely to look at developments on the Peninsula, two years
after the historic Inter-Korean summit of June 2000, particularly
in the aftermath of September 11, and recent developments in South
Korean and United States’ relations with North Korea.
I think the fact that Chairman Kim Jong Il has not yet seen fit to
reciprocate ROK President Kim Dae-jung’s statesmanship is to
be regretted. I also think North Korea has missed a major opportunity
by failing to support the campaign against terrorism (even if it signed
two UN conventions after September 11), improve ties with South Korea
and the United States, and take steps to allay concerns about its
strategic intentions and its weapons programs.
It was the North’s continuing failure to address these concerns
which led President Bush, in his State of the Union address this year,
to describe the DPRK as a "regime arming with missiles and weapons
of mass destruction, while starving its citizens", and to portray
the North Korean regime as part of an "axis of evil”.
While we in Australia choose our own words, we certainly share US
concerns about weapons of mass destruction and proliferation.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs threaten the security
of the region. The challenge President Bush issued for
North Korea to address international concerns has not been answered.
President Bush has reaffirmed the US commitment to the Korean Peninsula
- most recently during his visit to South Korea in February, when
he reiterated the longstanding US offer of dialogue with the North,
restated US support for the ROK policy of engagement with the DPRK,
and ruled out military action against the North.
Now we await – again - the DPRK response. US Special
Envoy Jack Pritchard is hoping to pay a visit to Pyongyang shortly.
We certainly hope that a visit can reinvigorate dialogue and cooperation
between the Koreas, and with the United States.
The signs are both encouraging – at least tentatively –
and discouraging. North-South dialogue was reinvigorated by
the visit to Pyongyang by South Korean Presidential Envoy Lim Dong-won
in April. Two rounds of family reunions were then held, in late
April and early May. But the DPRK pulled out of the economic
cooperation talks slated for early May in Seoul. As a result,
prospects for resumption of official (Ministerial-level and military)
talks remain uncertain.
So I take this opportunity to encourage the DPRK again to respond
positively to the United States offer of dialogue, and to renew cooperation
with the South.
Australia’s contribution to securing peace and stability on
the Korean Peninsula.
For our part, we are pleased to support the US alliance and presence
in South Korea. We are also very strong supporters of
US dialogue and cooperation with North Korea – and have over
the last six years actively injected Australian perspectives into
the policy-making process in Washington.
I believe firmly that a strong balance of deterrence and dialogue
with the DPRK is the best means of ensuring the stability of the Korean
Peninsula. I see no inconsistency between these two approaches:
the twin strategies of deterrence and engagement work together to
ensure stability.
To this end, we are strong supporters of the US-DPRK Framework Agreement
and the workof theKorean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation
(KEDO). Australia is the largest single non-executive contributor
to KEDO – having provided $22 million to date. KEDO plays
a vital role in reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation on the
Peninsula.
Australia is also one of the strongest and most active supporters
of the ROK’s engagement policy with the DPRK - a framework within
which the North and the South can reconcile their differences and
cooperate more closely. We were one of the first nations to
support President Kim Dae-jung's ‘Sunshine Policy’ for
the two Koreas to reconcile and cooperate.
Relations with North Korea
In May 2000, Australia resumed diplomatic relations with North Korea,
after an interruption to relations of some 25 years. Our reason
for resuming formal ties was motivated by my strong belief that dialogue
and engagement will help secure peace and prosperity on the Korean
Peninsula.
In our dialogue with North Korea, we support strongly President Kim’s
efforts to achieve a more stable and secure Korean Peninsula, and
we register with the North the need to address issues of international
concern – the proliferation of weapons and weapons technologies
chief amongst them.
We are encouraging the DPRK to comply fully with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and to meet its IAEA obligations. Last August,
we hosted a second nuclear safeguards training course, where North
Korean officials joined regional counterparts to develop expertise
in managing and accounting nuclear materials.
We take every opportunity to encourage the DPRK to allow IAEA inspectors
to verify that their declaration to the NPT is accurate, and complete.
And we continue to urge the North Koreans to stop developing and using
ballistic missile technologies, including beyond the 2003 moratorium.
At the same time, we are deeply concerned by the terrible suffering
experienced by people in the North. Our food aid and humanitarian
assistance, designed to alleviate that suffering, has totalled $30
million since 1996-97, and I have just approved a further $6 million
in assistance this year.
The DPRK regime simply does not seem to recognise the need for structural
reform. At USD757, GDP per capita is one-twelfth of that enjoyed
by the ROK. International aid organizations recently highlighted
that North Korea could plunge back into famine unless foreign donors
urgently send it more food. Some 6 million North Koreans are
said to be threatened by malnutrition and disease.
North Korea has depended on foreign aid to feed its people since
its farming industry collapsed in the mid-1990s after decades of mismanagement
and the loss of Soviet subsidies. Harvests in recent years have
improved, but the government expects a shortfall of nearly 1.5 million
tons of food this year.
Australia is seeking to address the roots of the food shortage in
a long-term and sustainable manner, as well as through providing food
aid. We are training North Koreans in market economics at the
Australian National University. The Australian Centre
for International Agricultural Research is training North Koreans
in soil and pest management, crop production and biotechnology related
to rice production. And we are helping DPRK statisticians so
that the nutritional needs of North Koreans can be identified.
I am keen to see this training continue and expand.
In June last year, during a visit by my North Korean counterpart
Mr Paek Nam-sun, I agreed that the DPRK could establish a resident
embassy in Australia. Three DPRK officials have been granted
resident diplomatic accreditation, and the DPRK has opened its embassy
in the Canberra suburb of O’Malley. Australia is discussing
arrangements for an Embassy in Pyongyang with North Korea.
Conclusion
The path to dialogue, cooperation and reconciliation between the
two Koreas depends largely on the behaviour and attitude of North
Korea. The positions of South Korea, and of the United States
and other regional players, are clear.
In the past two years, and especially since September 11, the DPRK
has had an opportunity to help decide the future of the region, and
the prosperity and security of all Koreans. Deterring adventurism
on the part of North Korea, and encouraging dialogue and cooperation
between the Koreas, therefore remain the cornerstones of our approach
to the Korean peninsula. A large part of that approach lies
in the warmth and strength of our relations with the South.
Our engagement with the DPRK does not mean we accept or condone the
policies or practices of the North. Indeed, the ideology of
the North and the behaviour of its government, at home and abroad,
are abhorrent to many of the values cherished by Australians.
Nonetheless, we must deal with the reality of the situation on the
Korean Peninsula – our approach indicates clearly our willingness
to play a thoughtful and constructive role in the affairs of our region.
It is a role welcomed by the ROK, the wider region and, I feel, the
DPRK. It is a role, I trust, that will help realise the aspirations
of Koreans across the Peninsula.
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