Introduction

I am delighted to launch today this volume, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, which has been prepared by my Department and published by Brown and Wilton.

This is a unique undertaking. But East Timor has been of such vast public interest in Australia, and of such compelling national importance, that I wanted to provide the Australian public with insights into the complex historical, political and diplomatic context in which events played out and, to the greatest degree possible, access to the deliberations and actions of their Government.

In compiling the record, the authors drew on public sources and on diplomatic reports, creating an account of particular authority. This publication, together with the volume Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976 released last year, reflects the commitment of both my Department and myself to providing the greatest possible access to material of unusual public interest.

The right time for change

The opportunity for change in East Timor came with the end of the Soeharto era, and our efforts to make a contribution to that process began following the change in leadership.

In early July 1998, during a visit to Jakarta, I undertook that Australia would conduct a survey of views of East Timorese leaders in the diaspora and within the territory on the way ahead. The key findings - including that the overwhelming majority of influential East Timorese would not accept any resolution not endorsed by the people - were critical to informing our own policy deliberations, and were also conveyed to Indonesia at the end of August 1998. The opportunity presented by a more open-minded president in Jakarta, together with this first-hand appreciation of how East Timorese leaders saw their future, combined to form the basis of our policy change, marked by the Prime Minister's letter to President Habibie in December 1998.

The book outlines how the Australian Government swung into action following Indonesia's announcement on 27 January 1999 that the people of East Timor would be given a choice on their future. Although we had urged self-determination for East Timor, Habibie's insistence that this take place during his presidency placed extraordinary strains on the international community's capacity to respond. In order not to lose this once-in-a-generation opportunity, Australia's support for such a process expanded from the political and diplomatic to the concrete, and Australia provided key financial, material and technical assistance to the UN mission in East Timor.

UNAMET was an enormously successful UN operation, delivering an incontestable public verdict on the autonomy proposal and the East Timorese people's desire to forge an independent future. UNAMET's success has, however, been overshadowed by the crisis that followed the ballot and the massive international response that rallied to end it.

Setting the record straight

Many have argued that the post-ballot crisis could have been averted if the international community had assumed responsibility for security before the ballot. But as the book shows, there was never any willingness on the part of Indonesia to relinquish responsibility for security. If this had been insisted upon by the other signatories to the 5 May Agreements, there would have been no agreements and no ballot. Who knows where East Timor would be now both in terms of an unresolved issue on the UN agenda, and as a society wracked by division and revolt.

The tragedy that befell East Timor in 1999 should never be forgotten, but it is also essential to guard against attempts to distort the historical record. There have been some egregious examples of this in recent times, including scandalous allegations that Australia was complicit in killings after the ballot, and that my Department ordered Australian soldiers to understate death tolls to protect the guilty.

The most recent manifestation of attempts to distort the historical record is the claim that the Government had prior intelligence of an attack on civilians sheltering in the Maliana police compound on 8 September 1999, and that Australia's failure to share that with the UN resulted in a missed opportunity to avert a massacre. The allegation is baseless. Australia had no forewarning of the attack, while the alleged reason for not sharing the information - to avoid offending Indonesia - is absurd in the context of our actions at that time. By 8 September, Australia was pressuring Indonesia to restore order in East Timor and allow in an international force. The ADF-assisted evacuation had begun and we had agreed to Kofi Annan's request to lead a possible peace enforcement operation. Australia had, since June of that year, made clear to Indonesia its explicit knowledge of TNI involvement with the militia. We, like the UN, had been doing everything possible to have TNI cease supporting the militia. Against this background, it is ridiculous to suggest Australia was suppressing information to avoid causing offence.

Another major claim made in some media accounts is that Australia withheld intelligence on East Timor from the US - especially on links between TNI and the pro-Jakarta militia - in order not to compromise our diplomatic objectives. That assertion is incorrect. I have received a written assurance from the Director-General of ONA confirming on behalf of all Australian intelligence agency heads that Australia maintained close and constant contact with the US in the intelligence field during the crisis, as was the case with policy areas, and held back nothing that would normally be shared between the two countries. Of course, no country shares all its information with other governments and some material will commonly be withheld in intelligence liaison arrangements - for example, when it is given in confidence by a third party or draws on particularly sensitive sources. The US itself observes such a policy. But during the East Timor crisis, Australia released to the US more than is normal under such arrangements because of the importance of the issue.

Other allegations claim that both Australia and UNAMET filtered out unwelcome news, ignoring reports of planned post-ballot violence. This, too, is incorrect. Australia based its post-ballot assessment on a range of information. In the period leading up to the ballot, we received reports of plans for post-ballot violence. Although predictions of its likelihood, magnitude and location varied, the reports provided additional grounds for Australia and UNAMET to further pressure Indonesia to rein in the militia. This was done and is a matter of record. Avoiding retribution was one of the key themes of my visit to Jakarta and Dili in late July 1999.

But these weren't the only reports and amid such predictions were opposite indications. Voter registration was a glowing success and the ballot turnout itself - 98.6% - was unambiguous endorsement of the process. Moreover, the fact that the ballot day proceeded virtually undisturbed could only have been a promising sign. The Government did not dismiss worst-case scenarios - rather, these were central to our contingency planning. It is noteworthy that not even the UN on the ground or Xanana Gusmao himself assessed wholesale destruction and violence motivated by retribution as the most probable outcome.

The challenges ahead

History will deliver the verdict about whether the ballot process was worth it. But the outcomes for the East Timorese are real: they have achieved self-determination and are soon to elect their future national leaders. During my visit to Dili last year for the first anniversary of the ballot, the thousands of smiling East Timorese who turned out for the celebration were, for me, the ultimate response to those who continue to question the success of the process.

There should be no doubt about the immensity of the challenges for East Timor as it approaches nationhood. The international community, including Australia, has already taken significant steps to assist East Timor towards independence. However, much more remains to be done to ensure that East Timor will become a viable and sustainable nation. Success will require the sustained commitment of East Timor's friends in the international community into the post-independence period - to provide security, civilian police support and assistance in civil administration. The UN's work in East Timor is not yet finished and continued strong assistance is essential to ensure the completion of critical nation-building activities. Independence should not be seen as the end of the UN's task but as another stage in the process of preparing the East Timorese to govern themselves. Australia will continue to play a pivotal role in this process, but we cannot succeed alone and look to East Timor's other international partners and the UN Security Council to maintain their invaluable support.

Australia will assist East Timor's longer term reconstruction and development through our aid program, focused on the key areas of governance, health, education, water supply, sanitation and rural development. And as part of Australia's enduring commitment to the emergence of a stable and democratic new nation, we are providing training support to the National Council and its Secretariat, building the capacity of the East Timorese to play a key role in the August Constituent Assembly elections and to conduct their own elections in the future.

Australia will continue its commitment to assist with the development of the new East Timorese nation and we expect others to do so as well. Australia will not waiver in our support of the East Timorese. Australia will remain a committed friend and partner of East Timor as the new nation faces the future.

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