The NPT - Future Challenges and Outlook for the 2000 Review Conference

Keynote speech by the Hon Alexander Downer MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Conference on Nuclear Arms Control: Australian and Regional Perspectives Towards 2000

University of Queensland, Brisbane, 29 October 1999

(Check Against Delivery)

I am honoured to be invited to speak here today on the crucially important subject of nuclear arms control. This is a challenge of paramount importance to all the world's nations, and one which the Government takes very seriously.

This is an appropriate time to be addressing these issues, with the First Committee of the General Assembly currently meeting in New York, and with less than six months before the start of the Sixth NPT Review Conference.

Today I want to address a number of issues on the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. In particular, I want to re-state Australia's commitment to the twin goals enshrined in the NPT of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and working towards their eventual elimination. I will explore what Australia is doing to achieve that state of affairs. Most importantly I will highlight the practical contribution we are making - because let's be sure of one thing here, if we are ever going to achieve the goals of the NPT we need to be realistic about how we go about them.

It is a statement of the obvious to say that reductions in nuclear armaments and their ultimate elimination can only happen slowly, incrementally, and in a verifiable and balanced way. I will also reflect upon the success of, and the challenges to, the NPT. Finally, I want to say a few words about Australia's approach to the Sixth NPT Review Conference next year.

The NPT's success - foundation of global nuclear arms control

The NPT is one of the most important, if not the most important, international arms control treaties in place. As the foundation of the global nuclear arms control regime, it has served our national interest well and served to enhance our security. The Government places a high national priority on its continuing strength.

In the 1960s, prior to the establishment of the NPT, commentators assessed that 20-25 states would develop or acquire nuclear weapons by the 1980s. A world with 25 or more nuclear armed states would have been a vastly more dangerous and unstable place than the one we actually face today. It is a measure of the NPT's success, and of the security benefits it delivers to the international community, that the spread of nuclear weapons projected in the 1960s has not been realised. We should never lose sight of that very welcome reality whenever we discuss the role of the Treaty in enhancing international security.

Let us look at the facts. In the final decade of this century, the NPT has become near-universal. While about 60 states remained outside the treaty in 1990, the number has now dropped to four: Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan. With 187 state parties, the NPT is the most widely supported arms control treaty. With the 1995 indefinite extension, it is now a permanent tenet of international law.

In achieving this near universal membership, we have seen a number of states - Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine - turn away from possession of nuclear weapons and seek their removal back to Russia. All have joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

South Africa, which acknowledged constructing half a dozen nuclear weapons in the late 1980s, eliminated them in 1991, thereby demonstrating that the spread of nuclear weapons is not irreversible. The genie can be put back in the bottle.

The nuclear weapon states - as part of their Article 6 "bargain" under the NPT - have also made considerable progress towards nuclear disarmament. The total number of warheads have been reduced from a high of 69,490 in 1986 to 36, 100 in 1997. That is a reduction of nearly 50%. Under START II total US and Russian deployed warheads will fall to 3,500 each. Even though the Russian Duma is yet to ratify START II, there is already agreement between the United States and Russia to commence discussions on a START III Treaty which promises to cut deployed Cold War arsenals by 80 percent from their peak.

In examining the importance of the NPT and the progress that has been made on arms control, care should be taken to keep the Treaty in context.

The Treaty is not a stand-alone instrument. It is the centrepiece of a nuclear arms control regime consisting of a series of interlocking international treaties, arrangements, undertakings and norms aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons and advancing nuclear disarmament.

Indeed, a feature of the post-Cold War era has been that, where new challenges have emerged, the international community has strongly supported the strengthening of the existing non-proliferation framework and the identification of possible new measures. Australia has been at the forefront of efforts to address those challenges and we have worked tirelessly to promote activities in support of a strong over-arching regime.

We remain one of the most active proponents of the International Atomic Energy Agency's strengthened safeguards system and played a prominent role in the negotiation of an Additional Protocol to improve and extend the IAEA'S inspection and access rights - we were in fact the first country to ratify an Additional Protocol Agreement. We particularly work to promote IAEA safeguards by conducting training programs in nuclear materials accountancy and control for participants from regional countries.

The newest element of the global nuclear arms control regime, and one to which I have made a strong personal commitment, is the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Australia played a major role in its conclusion by snatching it from the prospect of an untimely death in the Conference on Disarmament. I led international action to take the Treaty to the United Nations in New York where it was adopted by an overwhelming majority of 127 countries. It was very satisfying to be able to sign the CTBT for Australia on 24 September 1996.

It goes without saying that Australia is deeply disappointed and concerned by the recent decision of the US Senate to vote against ratification of the CTBT. This is a decision which is difficult to understand and which works against the United States' own security interests.

Australia joined many other countries, including two nuclear weapon states (the United Kingdom and France), in urging the Senate to ratify the Treaty. In the lead-up to the vote I wrote to a number of Republican Senators setting out the benefits to the United States, and to the world, of ratification and our Ambassador in Washington also spoke to a number of influential Senators urging them to support the Treaty.We cannot pretend that the Senate vote is not a significant setback to the CTBT. It will make it more difficult to persuade Russia and China to ratify the Treaty and to persuade India and Pakistan to sign. But the CTBT is not dead - it remains a powerful international norm against further nuclear testing and with 154 state signatories it is already rapidly approaching the status of a universal treaty. Fifty one states, including twenty six of the 44 required for entry into force, have ratified the treaty.

Significant progress has also been made in establishing the International Monitoring System, which is a key component of the Treaty's verification machinery. We should also not forget that all five nuclear weapon states have signed the Treaty, and therefore have an obligation under international law not to frustrate its purpose before it enters into force.

Australia will continue to work to bring the Treaty into force. We were an active participant at the recent Article XIV Conference in Vienna which discussed measures to facilitate this goal. We will work with others to secure further signatures and ratifications by the 44. We will also continue to encourage the US Administration to mobilise the very significant support for the CTBT amongst the people of the United States, so as to convince the Senate of its worth. Finally, before leaving the CTBT, I should underline President Clinton's commitment to continuing the policy observed by the United States since 1992, of not conducting nuclear explosive tests.

Another key element of the nuclear arms control regime will be the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference identified the negotiation of an FMCT as one of the most urgent disarmament and non-proliferation steps the international community should take. We remain strongly committed to an FMCT and are working to have the Conference on Disarmament commence negotiations on it as soon as possible. Australia has been prominent in working on technical aspects of an FMCT.

I should also make mention of two other important elements of the global nuclear arms control regime which are strongly supported by Australia.
Nuclear Weapons Free Zones complement the NPT in limiting the threat posed by nuclear weapons . We welcome the opening for signature of two more treaties in Southeast Asia and Africa, building upon widely accepted existing pacts in our region and those in Latin America and the Caribbean. By the time all these zones take full effect, all land areas in the Southern Hemisphere will be included in nuclear weapon free zones, with the exception of a few islands in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, both of which provide guidelines on the export of items for nuclear use, serve to reinforce the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT. Australia is an active member of both groups.

Challenges to the nuclear arms control regime

I have outlined some of the successes of the nuclear arms control regime, but there have also been challenges.

The nuclear tests in South Asia last year struck at the international norm against proliferation. They also increased tensions and introduced the threat of a South Asian nuclear arms race. Australia has participated in meetings of the South Asian Task Force (SATF), established to coordinate the responses of countries concerned by the nuclear testing, and the next meeting is scheduled for 5 November.

We welcome constructive comments on arms control made by my Indian counterpart, Jaswant Singh, after the recent Indian elections, including that signature of the CTBT was a high priority for the new Government. It is also vital that Pakistan join the CTBT.

We urge both countries to apply stringent export controls in support of global non-proliferation norms and to exercise restraint in missile development and testing. We would also hope that India and Pakistan join the NWS in placing a moratorium on production of fissile material, and participate in negotiations on an FMCT.
In other parts of the world, there is a continuing need to remain vigilant in looking for clandestine nuclear weapons programs and in maintaining pressure on non-compliant states.

Australia adds its voice to others who have expressed the concern that, for nearly a year now, the IAEA has been unable to carry out inspection activity in Iraq in accordance with its mandate under Security Council Resolution 687. We welcome the IAEA's commitment to resume verification in Iraq as soon as circumstances allow.

Similarly, we are concerned about the lack of cooperation from the DPRK in fulfilling its obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It is crucial that the DPRK preserve all information needed by the Agency to be able to verify its initial inventory declaration.

Nonetheless, we welcome the recent apparent improvement in relations between the DPRK and other countries. We hope this will be reflected in reduced tensions in the region and improved North Korean cooperation with the IAEA. We also expect the continued effective operation of the Agreed Framework and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO).

Another challenge to the nuclear arms control regime is reconciling some of the differences which arise from within the NPT regime itself.

There are some who consider that the nuclear weapon states - Russia and the United States in particular - are not living up to the commitment they made in the Treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating ..... to nuclear disarmament". This is the message of the New Agenda coalition, for example. The Australian Government does not accept this proposition.

There are no short-cuts when it comes to nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is difficult, slow and expensive. It is not immune to broader global developments and the state of US-Russia relations. And it can only be achieved in a stable and verifiable way when the parties concerned have fully negotiated and have confidence in the measures being undertaken.

Against that background, there is a tendency to underestimate the progress already made - much has been done on nuclear disarmament.

This, in our view, is the flaw in the approach taken by the New Agenda coalition. While there are elements of the draft New Agenda resolution before the United Nations General Assembly that Australia could support, taken as a whole it presupposes the failure of the existing disarmament and non-proliferation regime - a contention we simply do not accept. The resolution ignores the reality that nuclear disarmament is difficult and slow, and it risks making debate on nuclear disarmament in forums such as the NPT even more polarised.

Let me make it quite clear: the Australian Government is fully committed to working, by balanced and progressive steps, towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. As I said at the beginning it is an obvious political reality that reductions in nuclear weapons - leading to a world free of them - muct be made incrementally. Our interest is in promoting a realistic, balanced approach to nuclear disarmament, which takes account of strategic realities and which, importantly, stands the best chance of engaging the nuclear weapon states constructively. We have urged the Russian Duma to ratify START II and have encouraged both Russia and the United States to continue their preliminary discussions on START III.

For the time being the onus for nuclear disarmament lies with the nuclear weapon states, but non-nuclear weapons states can reinforce non-proliferation and disarmament goals, such as by encouraging entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. This year Australia is cosponsoring First Committee resolutions on the CTBT and the FMCT aimed at progressing the entry into force of the CTBT and the early commencement of FMCT negotiations. We are hopeful that the resolutions will generate overwhelming support.

Another challenge for the international community in the new millennium will be to ensure that nuclear weapon reductions in Russia do not result in the diversion of nuclear weapons or fissile material. Australia, therefore, welcomes international assistance programs to deal with possible proliferation threats and, in particular, applauds the significant efforts the United States has made.

Finally, fresh concerns about the need for ballistic missile defences and the debate about their implications for the international security system, including the ABM treaty, are relevant to the NPT. We look to those principally involved to negotiate in good faith about their respective security concerns, and to ensure that these issues do not provide a reason for delaying progress with other established priorities.

The Way Forward

Next year's NPT Review Conference in New York provides an opportunity to address some of the challenges to the nuclear arms control regime, while also giving recognition to its tremendous achievements to date.

Australia will strive to achieve positive outcomes at the Conference that reinforce the NPT. Our interests and those of the wider international community are best served by a strong Treaty.

Australia recognises that it will be a difficult Review Conference and that some participants may have unrealistic expectations. We will be seeking a balanced review of the NPT which evenly covers all aspects of the Treaty - so that no single issue dominates to the detriment of others.

On nuclear disarmament, the Review Conference will need to recognise the progress already made and focus on balanced and realistic future objectives which are capable of receiving the support of all groups of states. Flexibility will be required on the part of member states.

We have already started consultations with countries across all political groupings in an effort to shape a favourable outcome at the Review Conference. We are emphasising to all states that they and the international community have a lot at stake in the NPT. We are also taking the opportunity of the bilateral nuclear arms control consultations which we undertake with a range of countries in the region, to shape a favourable outcome for the Review Conference next year.

We are also interested in the views of the wider community and the upcoming National Consultative Committee on Peace and Disarmament will provide a valuable forum for the exchange of such views.

Australia will be working to encourage further adherence to the Additional Protocol by those states which have comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. We will also be encouraging those states which are yet to conclude such agreements with the IAEA to do so without further delay.

Finally, progress on nuclear disarmament will in itself be influenced by developments in other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) control regimes. Australia continues to take an active and leading role in strengthening international arrangements to control all WMD.

We continue to work long and hard to get widespread and full compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention; we are continuing with efforts to obtain international agreement on a protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention; and we continue to chair the Australia Group as part of our efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons.

Conclusion

A key theme of this Conference is Australian perspectives on nuclear arms control. I have given you a brief outline of what our Government sees as the successes of the NPT, as well as some of its challenges. An enormous amount has been achieved, but we still have more work to do. The nuclear weapon states obviously have a particular contribution to make, but sustained effort by all parties to the Treaty is required if we are to succeed.

As those of you here will be aware, these are difficult issues where there are many interlocking influences. As such, it is necessary to work simultaneously on a number of fronts to ensure the enduring strength of the nuclear arms control regime. The Australian Government is pursuing that aim actively, through our work on the CTBT, on safeguards, on the FMCT and in the lead up to the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We will also continue to play an active and constructive role in controlling other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The Australian Government's approach to nuclear arms control is guided by its commitment to the regime which for nearly 30 years has delivered significant and tangible security benefits to Australia, the region and the globe. We are committed to working with like-minded parties to ensure that it remains strong and effective in the next millennium.

ENDS

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