East Timor and Australia: AIIA Contributions to the Policy Debate

Speech by the Hon Alexander Downer MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the launch of the book East Timor and Australia: AIIA Contributions to the Policy Debate

Parliament House, Canberra, 25 May 1999

(Check Against Delivery)

Introduction - the AIIA and the East Timor Debate

Thank you, James Cotton; ladies and gentlemen.

I was very pleased to be able to accept Professor Cotton's invitation to launch this collection of papers from the Australian Institute of International Affairs on East Timor and Australia. The AIIA has for many years been the pre-eminent non-government institution dealing with all aspects of Australia's foreign relations, and has played a vital role in encouraging debate on many aspects of our country's diplomatic and trade policies. And since 1975 the topic of East Timor, naturally enough, has often featured in discussions at AIIA Branches around Australia.

Thanks to James Cotton and his team, we are now able to find in one volume some of the Institute's most insightful contributions to the Australian policy debate on East Timor. As you might expect, there are some things in this book with which I agree, and others with which I must take issue. But one thing is clear - that this volume is a timely addition in the Institute's great tradition of constructive and thoughtful contribution to the process of foreign policy formulation in Australia.

Of particular interest is the strong historical focus of the book, which places the issues in context and offers several differing viewpoints on the development of Australian Government approaches to East Timor in the periods before and after the crucial events of 1975. I offer no comment on the policies of that time - I leave that to those in the Governments of the day who were responsible for them. I do, however, find the various essays in the book particularly useful in indicating what was going through the minds of policy-makers at the time, thinking which some contemporary commentators feel comfortable in judging with the benefit of 25 years of hindsight.

Our Current Policy Response

For our Government, like all others, East Timor also looms large on the foreign policy agenda. Two considerations were prominent in our thinking. First, that something had to be done to meet the legitimate aspirations of the people of East Timor for self-determination. And second, that the matter of East Timor had for too long been an irritant in Australia's broader relationship with Indonesia.

The fundamental changes in Indonesian politics unleashed by the economic crisis proved to be the key also to the deadlock over East Timor's future. With President Suharto gone, all kinds of previously-taboo matters became the legitimate subjects of political debate - including the future status of East Timor.

Recognising that opportunity, Prime Minister Howard last year wrote to President Habibie, suggesting that East Timor be given autonomy, after which an act of self-determination would take place. Mr Howard also made it clear that Australia supported the release of Xanana Gusmao, who would play a crucial role in the process of reconciliation.

That was a letter which, as both President Habibie and Xanana Gusmao have since told me, helped catalyse thinking in Indonesia, leading to the announcement on possible independence for East Timor and Xanana's transfer from prison.

Since that time, Australia has been heavily involved in the discussions surrounding East Timor's future. Of course, the key to diplomatic moves on the territory's future has been the sixteen-year long negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal, which culminated in the signature of the Tripartite Agreement at the United Nations in New York on 5 May. Australia was not a party to those negotiations, but we made clear to all parties our strong support for the process, including our willingness to offer practical assistance for the Agreement's implementation.

And we've moved quickly to put that assistance in place. We've already committed A$10 million to the UN Trust Fund, and have pledged a further $10 million in "in-kind" logistical support (particularly to help the UN advance team get established). You'll be aware of our agreement to provide AFP officers as civilian police advisers, and two Australian Electoral Commission officials have been seconded to the UN headquarters to help with electoral planning.

We're also acting to ensure that Australia has the resources it needs to deal with the rapidly changing situation in East Timor. We are making good progress towards the establishment of a Consulate in Dili and our Liaison Office in Lisbon - set up to ensure closer dialogue with Portugal in the intensive period ahead - is now up and running. And the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has established an East Timor Task Force to coordinate work in this area.

As the process of gaining self-determination for East Timor has unfolded, the Australian Government has never wavered from two objectives. First, that the East Timorese people must be fully consulted at all stages. Second, that whatever direction that change may take, it must occur in a peaceful and orderly manner.

If the second of these objectives is to be met, real efforts must be made to address the question of security, in particular the activities of the militias. This is a matter we have taken up with the Indonesian Government at the highest levels since the discussions on the territory's future first began, and I expect will remain a preoccupation until this process is concluded.

We continue to press the point that, under the Tripartite Agreement, Indonesia is responsible for law and order in East Timor and for protecting its people. Indonesia's Armed Forces must act to restore security, bring those responsible for the violence and killings to account, and take action to create an environment in which the East Timorese can vote free from violence and intimidation. These points were made most recently by Ambassador McCarthy and Embassy officials who visited East Timor from 6-13 May.

Despite all this, we still hear the call from bunyip Napoleons for Australia to send peacekeeping forces to East Timor immediately. I'd make two observations on those demands. First, the ink on the Tripartite Agreement, which was negotiated by the parties directly involved, is hardly dry, and it would be presumptuous in the extreme for a non-party like Australia to declare it dead, and demand new action. Second, such people seem to confuse "peacekeeping" with "gunboat diplomacy" in their enthusiasm for us to "go and teach the natives a thing or two". Perhaps they need to be taught the lesson learnt by my children long ago - that talking tough doesn't make you tough, any more than wearing a costume will make you Superman.

Conclusion - the Need to Maintain Momentum

I make no apologies for declaring that our Government will stick with its current practice on East Timor - of pursuing principle and substance before posturing and the sound-bite, and practical benefit for the people of East Timor before ideological vendettas and smug self-righteousness.

The truth is, real progress has been made towards a legitimate act of self-determination by the East Timorese people, the kind of progress that could only have been dreamed about as little as one short year ago. Of course more needs to be done. Of course the momentum we have developed needs to be maintained, and even pushed along. We will be doing just that in the months to come.

What we won't be doing is allowing ourselves to be diverted from that main objective. I'm not interested in re-fighting the ideological battles of 1975. I'm concentrating on the best outcome now for the peoples of East Timor and of Indonesia - and, thereby, the best interests of the people of Australia.

With that in mind, I welcome this book from the AIIA. It may help us all to join in an informed and constructive debate - not on the "what if" of history, but on the "what should be" of our future.

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