ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

 
Address by The Hon Alexander Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Netherlands Atlantic Commission, The Hague, 27 January 1997.

 

(GIVEN AT 0800 CANBERRA TIME, 28 JANUARY 1997)

Introduction

I am delighted to have the opportunity to speak to you today. This is my first official visit to the Netherlands as Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am particularly pleased to address such a prestigious gathering of policy and opinion-makers with a strong interest in European and global security.

I am aware of the important role which the Netherlands Atlantic Commission plays in promoting informed public debate on security issues.

While the commission's focus has been on European and transatlantic issues, it has also organised conferences and seminars on global security issues. I am pleased that the commission has recently decided to broaden further its focus to cover regional security developments outside Europe.

Speaking to a Dutch audience about Asian regional security issues is particularly appropriate because our two countries have a common outlook on international security policy.

More than that, Australia has a close and longstanding relationship with the Netherlands based on shared values, historical links and very strong people-to-people ties. The Netherlands is an important interlocutor for Australia on European issues, and I believe the Dutch Government values Australian perspectives on developments in our region.

Australia is part of a region undergoing profound transformation - changes that require a new look at the relevance of existing ideas and structures.

I want to emphasise today that Australia is in the vanguard of efforts to meet these new challenges as we prepare to enter the 21st century.

In that context, I want to focus today on three major themes.

First, I will outline the Australian Government's perspective on the major trends and developments that are shaping the regional environment.

Second, I will outline the evolution of the new regional security architecture, including how it is being shaped by Asia's culture and circumstances, which are quite different from Europe's.

Third, I will suggest how Europe can contribute to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region, particularly through the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia-Europe meeting process.

PART ONE: The Asia Pacific's Changing Security Environment

1.1 Economic Transformation

These days, no-one can argue successfully that security issues - whether national, regional or global - can somehow be quarantined or separated from economic developments, least of all in the Asia Pacific region or, for that matter, Europe.

Prosperity and security are increasingly intertwined - for Australia, and every other country in the Asia Pacific region and beyond.

That is why the recent dramatic changes in the economic landscape of the Asia Pacific are the starting point for any cogent analysis of what is happening in the region.

East Asia's sustained rapid growth has created a new sense of common interest in stability. The region's economic profile is almost unrecognisable when compared with the mid-1970s.

The East Asian developing economies within APEC have grown by almost 8 per cent annually since 1973. In the process, the Korean economy has expanded in real terms more than five-fold, and the Thai and Singapore economies more than four-fold.

For its part, Australia is increasingly enmeshed in the region's economic transformation.

Over half of Australia's total foreign direct investment goes to APEC countries, and we earn three out of four of our export dollars in APEC markets.

I am cautiously optimistic that regional growth will continue at high rates at least until the year 2020. By 2020, four of the world's ten largest economies will be in Asia - Japan, China, Korea and India. Indonesia will be near the top of the next ten, which will also include Thailand and Australia.

This outlook raises important questions about the sustainability of growth and political stability, as well as resource, environmental, population growth and demography issues.

Economic growth is likely to be greatest in the region's major cities, and this will place huge strains on basic services such as water, sanitation and shelter.

The sheer scale of growth in the region will continue to challenge world markets to deliver the resources and capital needed to sustain it.

That is why continued trade and investment liberalisation, both through APEC and the World Trade Organisation, is absolutely vital.

I am pleased to say that, at the most recent APEC meeting in the Philippines in November 1996, regional leaders demonstrated their determination to give effect to the Bogor Leaders Declaration of 1994 - free trade and investment for industrialised members by 2010 and for developing members by 2020.

For the first time, members tabled their Individual Action Plans, which set out the practical steps they will take. These action plans are a reasonable first step in what will be a 15-25 year process. More than that, APEC is delivering real benefits not just to APEC members but to non-member economies in Europe. Because APEC is liberalising on the basis of open regionalism, improvements in access as tariffs fall will be shared by all suppliers, provided they remain competitive.

APEC's trade and investment agenda promotes mutual economic dependencies which help reduce the risk of conflict. They do not, of course, guarantee peace, but they make it very rewarding.

APEC, though not a security forum, also complements the direct security activities of the ASEAN Regional Forum, to which I shall return shortly.

APEC is unique in bringing together leaders from across the Asia Pacific, as was demonstrated last November by the successful meetings between our Prime Minister John Howard and President Jiang Zemin of China, and between US President Clinton and President Jiang. The resulting habits of consultation and the personal relationships do much to strengthen regional trust and confidence.

1.2 Security After the Cold War

The economic transformation of the region has been matched by equally important changes in the security environment.

The post-Cold War era has brought challenges as well as opportunities. The regional security environment is now more fluid, complex and uncertain.

In North East Asia, for example, it would have been very difficult during the Cold War to imagine the rapidly developing relationship we now see between China and South Korea. In South East Asia, Vietnamese membership of ASEAN would have been equally unlikely.

Looking to the future, a fundamental consideration for the Asia Pacific's security outlook will be the evolution of relationships between the region's major powers: the United States, China, Japan, Russia and, in the longer term, India.

Consideration must also be given to the legitimate claims of the middle-sized regional powers who will want a bigger say in managing the strategic affairs of the region.

Issues such as the competing claims and interests over the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait are all manageable, but they nevertheless pose challenges for the region, as does the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Beyond these core concerns, a range of other security issues have added extra layers of complexity to the regional security environment.

The region has to come to grips with problems such as international terrorism, drug trafficking and international crime.

Other non-military threats to security such as international health epidemics and mass migrations of politically or economically disenfranchised people must also be taken into account.

PART TWO: Designing A New Security Architecture

Clearly, these new security challenges require the building and deepening of cooperative linkages. You cannot just put up the shutters and hope the difficult issues will go away.

Indeed, the region must take advantage of the window of opportunity which regional peace and stability now provides to develop mechanisms and processes to manage the future strategic environment and deal with difficult issues as they arise.

2.1 Asia Pacific Realities

Above all else, the new regional security architecture needs to fit the realities of the Asia Pacific. Those realities are very different from the European system as it has evolved in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Let me suggest six principal ways in which the Asia Pacific differs from Europe.

First, most governments and elites see internal cohesion as their country's principal security risk, and they see regional stability and economic growth as essential to managing that risk. That commits them strongly to regional cooperation.

Second, few countries - apart from the possible exception of the Koreas - see an adversarial stance as being central to any relationship with their neighbours. This means that the security dilemma that drove defence postures in Europe, and later in the Cold War, operates less strongly.

In other words, few East Asian countries face the dilemma that increasing one's own security automatically decreases that of one's neighbours. It follows that, in most cases, it makes sense to talk in terms of security "risks" rather than security "threats".

Third, the Asia Pacific security environment is influenced by the large number of maritime borders, and by the fact that most territorial disputes are in the maritime environment. This requires different ways of managing security cooperation than in largely land-based environments.

Fourth, there is no pervasive ideological force which predisposes the Asia Pacific to systemic conflict. For example, there is no equivalent to the nationalism and irredentism which helped drive the European imperial system into conflict in World War I, and which still echoes in Bosnia.

Fifth, East Asian governments - unlike their European counterparts - tend to have a preference for informal decision-making, for oral commitments, and for leaving differences unresolved where there is no urgent need to reach a conclusion.

This has the positive effect of quarantining many differences - like the many territorial and boundary disputes in the region.

But it also means that the region is relatively unpractised in managing differences that have become urgent - which is something it may increasingly need to address in coming years as the economic implications of territorial disputes become more pressing.

Sixth and finally, the presence of the United States acts in the Asia Pacific as a moderator of potential conflict. Unlike in the former European central balance, or during the Vietnam War era in Asia, the US is now not a party to an adversarial system.

In the post-Cold War era, US alliances in the region are not directed at an adversary - they function to secure the US presence in and commitment to the region.

The US presence strengthens regional countries' confidence in their security - in effect taking most issues of potential conflict off the agenda. This is most obvious in North East Asia, where for example Japan and South Korea have not only refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons but have also undertaken legal obligations never to acquire them.

These six factors are important assets for continuing stability in the Asia Pacific. But growing defence capabilities, and the increasing economic significance of some territorial disputes, mean that regional governments need to apply these assets to the task of helping to manage the evolution of the new architecture.

That is exactly what they are doing.

The region's emerging security pattern is seen most clearly in the growing web of relationships in the region - bilateral, sub-regional and region-wide linkages, some formal, some informal. All contribute to building a sense of trust, a sense of common interests and of shared responsibility for the region's future.

2.2 Australia's Vital Contribution to a More Secure Region.

For its part, the Australian Government has specifically set out to help develop a regional security environment which forestalls resort to force in international disputes, prevents the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and encourages cooperation to enhance the security of the region as a whole.

The Bilateral and Sub-Regional Level

At the bilateral level, there is growing acceptance that strong, confident relationships underpin regional stability.

Australia sees its alliance with the United States in that light, as, I believe, do others who have such alliances. In July last year, Australia gave new vigour to its alliance with the United States through the AUSMIN joint declaration, the focus of which was very much on the contribution the alliance makes to regional security.

Australia has also been building a wide-ranging set of bilateral linkages - under the rubric of "practical bilateralism".

They include ANZUS, the agreement on maintaining security with Indonesia, the joint declaration with Papua New Guinea, and closer defence relations with New Zealand.

The Five Power Defence Arrangements - which include Australia, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, Singapore and New Zealand - provide for similar cooperation at a sub-regional level.

In addition to these more formal linkages, Australia has a range of less formal - but nonetheless strong and growing - bilateral defence and security ties with other South East Asian countries.

Australia is also strengthening its bilateral security links with North East Asian countries. Last year, Australia commenced officials-level political-military talks with Korea and Japan. The Australian Government has also reached agreement on official discussions with China on regional security.

Australia wants to extend bilateral dialogue with India on political, disarmament and security issues. The recent success of the Australia-India New Horizons promotion underlines the importance the Australian Government attaches to the relationship with India.

Of course, the bilateral relationships that contribute most to shaping the regional environment are those between the major powers.

Australia welcomed the Joint Declaration signed by President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto in April 1996. It revitalised the commitment of both sides to the US-Japan security agreement.

It is equally important to look beyond traditional alliance relationships, and support the strengthening of other key bilateral ties, for example between the United States and China.

Because, in the end, integration of all regional countries in a shared security system is the best assurance of regional stability.

Let me digress briefly to try to bury the fruitless argument about whether the world should contain or engage China.

The overwhelming fact is that China is already deeply engaged with the rest of the world, and its engagement is accelerating. Australia welcomes that process unequivocally.

China is firmly integrated into the regional and global economy. Twenty years ago it ranked below 30 among the world's exporters, now it is in the top ten and climbing fast. It is contributing strongly to regional growth - and benefiting us all.

China is also playing an active and constructive role in international and regional forums.

In March this year, for instance, Beijing will co-host the first governmental multilateral security meeting ever held in China - the ASEAN Regional Forum's inter-sessional group on confidence-building measures.

The Regional Level

What is happening at the bilateral and sub-regional level is familiar enough in a European context. But where the Asia Pacific becomes unique is in the way in which its regional institutions are developing.

The ASEAN Regional Forum, or the ARF, is quite unlike European security institutions or models.

It is characterised by minimal institutionalisation. It functions through consensus decision-making and has an evolutionary approach to achieving objectives.

Importantly, the ARF brings together all the countries which have an impact on or are involved in the security of the East Asia/Pacific region. It helps create a sense of strategic community in the region.

It is the means by which governments can begin to strengthen confidence in each others' intentions. It helps create the right atmosphere and framework for bilateral linkages to flourish.

The ARF is still in its infancy, but it is starting to get practical results.

The first level of the ARF's activities - confidence-building - is maturing as a useful mechanism for developing a sense of shared strategic interest. Region-wide security dialogues on sensitive issues like the future of Burma and the Korean peninsula have now been undertaken.

Below the ministerial level, the ARF has a crowded program of inter-sessional meetings, which are now developing practical cooperative confidence-building measures.

The first results are annual defence policy statements and the increased publication of defence white papers. These are of variable quality, but are reinforcing transparency in a region where that has not been traditional in state policy. They are important because of the increase in regional defence expenditures.

Military exchanges are on the increase. Exchanges on confidence-building measures already involve military officers. ARF members are beginning to look positively at notification of military exercises and at allowing observers from other ARF countries to military exercises.

Preventive diplomacy - the second stage of the ARF's activities - is also showing good potential. At the third ARF meeting in July last year, for example, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, used his good offices as chairman to convey ARF members' concerns about the situation in Burma to the Burmese Foreign Minister.

I am pleased to say that Australia played an instrumental role in this initiative.

Success with the ARF's confidence-building and preventive diplomacy stages may lead in future to a third stage - the resolution of conflict through agreed mechanisms.

How and when that could happen is not yet clear, as there are some sensitivities, but I am keen to see the ARF make an early start on dispute resolution and conflict avoidance.

I would point out that the ARF has already produced practical results in only three years through what is becoming an established pattern of effective diplomacy.

Observers brought up with the tradition of European statecraft sometimes question the value of the ARF because it is not able at this stage to resolve disputes between members and regulate security affairs. My answer is that the ARF was never conceived as the sole means of managing security in the Asia Pacific.

As seen in the case of the South China Sea, the ARF adds a new regional layer to security relationships that helps the management of issues at other levels.

The ARF is a unique body. It is developing in its own way and its own time. It was never intended to become a collective defence arrangement. It was born out of the idea of defence with others, not against others. That idea makes practical sense in a region where the security dilemma is generally less pressing than in recent European history.

The ARF needs to use the present favourable period to develop dialogue further on issues such as defence planning and acquisition. It should also take forward the agenda on preventive diplomacy and dispute resolution.

One important issue that remains to be explored is the further development of regional exchanges between defence authorities. We are already seeing active participation by defence officials in ARF inter-sessional meetings, a process that could build towards meetings of more senior defence planners and defence chiefs.

It makes sense to look forward to an inclusive meeting of regional defence ministers at some stage in the future.

Beyond the ARF, Australia has sought to bolster attempts at regional co-operation by taking important practical steps.

For example, reflecting the priority the government attaches to improving security on the Korean peninsula, in April last year we contributed $ 2 million to support KEDO - the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation.

PART THREE: What Europe Can Contribute

As Asia Pacific countries work towards shaping this new security environment, it will obviously make good sense to investigate where the European experience has relevance.

Australia recognises that Europe has major interests in Asia Pacific stability and continued economic growth - just as Asia Pacific countries have in Europe.

It is in the interests of both regions to build connections, which is why Australia has welcomed the establishment of the Asia-Europe meeting process. As you will be aware, Australia is interested in contributing to that process. I believe that Australia's very extensive links with East Asia are a distinctive asset - our perceptions, interests and experience can add value and insight to the discussions.

For similar reasons, Europe has the potential to contribute to the development of new Asia Pacific security mechanisms. European countries have considerable experience in confidence-building and preventive diplomacy. This experience could well be useful, but it is only likely to be of interest to regional countries if it is adapted to the very different Asia Pacific context I outlined earlier.

For example, Australia welcomes the practical contributions to the development of ARF thinking which have come from the second track workshops on preventive diplomacy and non-proliferation co-hosted between European and Asia Pacific countries late last year.

Australia also looks forward to working with the Netherlands during its participation in ARF meetings this year during its term as EU President.

Australia appreciates, too, the pivotal contribution that Europe has made to the international disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.

An excellent example of this was Australia's initiative last year to salvage the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which could not have succeeded without the strong support of a wide range of European nations, including the important contribution made by the Netherlands as chair of the CTBT negotiations in Geneva.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I cannot emphasise too much that the shaping of the Asia Pacific regional security environment is an unprecedented and exciting opportunity to build long-term security.

But it requires a foundation of trust, and a willingness to be creative and pragmatic.

It requires balancing the step-by-step approach favoured by those in the region, with a determination to carry through practical measures in the time allowed by the present window of opportunity.

It requires policy-makers to keep in mind that the Asia Pacific does face different realities from those in Europe, and that this means the security architecture will evolve somewhat differently.

I can say without hesitation that Australia is keen to draw on European experience.

I am equally sure that the Netherlands Atlantic Commission will be at the forefront of European institutions in suggesting practical and creative ways to improve the security of the Asia Pacific as we move together into the 21st century.