ASIA PACIFIC SECURITY: PRACTICAL COOPERATION IN AN ASIAN CONTEXT

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia

ASIA PACIFIC SECURITY: PRACTICAL COOPERATION IN AN ASIAN CONTEXT

Address by The Hon Alexander Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 19 September 1996.

As Delivered

Introduction

Australia is part of a region undergoing profound transformation - changes that challenge the value and relevance of old ideas and structures. It is within this framework that I wish to present today the Government's approach to the emerging Asia-Pacific security landscape.

First, dramatic economic growth and the inevitable changes following the break-up of the Soviet Union provide both a unique opportunity - and the need - to build a new regional security architecture within the Asia Pacific region.

Second, the new security architecture must inevitably take into account Asia's culture and circumstances, which are quite different from Europe's. As such, it must therefore incorporate the principle of consensus and be less formalised than Europe's collective defence arrangements.

Third, Europe can contribute to Asia Pacific security issues through dialogue processes such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia Europe process.

PART ONE: The Asia Pacific's Evolving Security Environment

Before considering the management of the new security environment, it is necessary to examine in more detail the most striking features of the transformation occurring in the Asia Pacific.

1.1 Economic Transformation

The first feature of the region is East Asia's sustained rapid growth, which is creating a new sense of common interest in stability, but at the same time creating challenges that call for purposeful management.

Rapidly growing intra-regional trade and investment, and cross-border production processes, are strengthening interdependencies, which are building a consensus among governments that regional stability is the highest priority of their external policy.

At the same time, however, the sheer scale of growth is challenging world markets to deliver the resources and capital need to sustain it. For example, Asian demand for infrastructure capital could average US$150 billion annually during the next decade, almost twice the capital flows into Asia in peak years to date.

That is why continued trade and investment liberalisation, both through APEC and the World Trade Organisation, is absolutely vital.

Beyond that, the further implications of the economic transformation have yet to unfold. But it is clear that economic developments are leading to shifts in relative power between countries and that increased wealth allows regional countries to upgrade their defence capabilities. There is no evidence yet of an arms race, in the sense of reactive purchases designed to counter an adversary's weapons systems, but the potential may arise as modernisation proceeds.

1.2 The End of the Cold War

If economic growth is the principal driver of the region's transformation, the end of the Cold War has opened up critical issues about how to shape that transformation.

The break-up of the Soviet Union effectively brought to an end those tensions which had been played out in the Asia Pacific region and opened up major opportunities to construct cooperative strategies.

In North East Asia, for example, it would have been impossible to imagine the rapidly developing relationship we now see between China and South Korea. In South East Asia, Vietnamese membership of ASEAN was equally inconceivable.

Even where the after-image of the Cold War remains, in the Korean Peninsula, solutions are now more achievable.

India's emergence as an active regional player reflects a determination by New Delhi to capitalise on the opportunities of the post-Cold War era.

But the post-Cold War era has brought challenges as well as opportunities. The regional security environment is more fluid, complex and uncertain.

A fundamental consideration will be the changing interrelationships between the major powers - the United States, China, Japan, Russia and in the longer term India.

At the same time other regional countries, and particularly middle powers like South Korea and the bigger ASEANs, will want a strong say in managing the strategic affairs of the region.

PART TWO: Developing New Security Architecture

These new factors demand that the region carefully manage the evolution of a new security architecture. Regional countries need to talk much more about shaping the future while the present relatively benign environment prevails.

2.1 Asia Pacific Realities

The new architecture needs to fit the realities of the Asia Pacific. Those realities are very different from the European system as it has evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Let me suggest six principal ways in which the Asia Pacific differs from Europe.

First, most governments and elites see internal cohesion as their country's principal security risk, and they see regional stability and economic growth as essential to managing that risk. That commits them strongly to regional cooperation.

Second, few countries - the Koreas apart - see an adversarial relationship as being central to any relationship with their neighbours. This means that the security dilemma that drove defence postures in Europe, and later in the Cold War, operates less strongly.

In other words, few East Asian countries face the dilemma that increasing one's own security automatically decreases that of one's neighbours. It follows that, in most cases, it makes sense to talk in terms of security "risks" rather than security "threats".

Third, the Asia Pacific security environment is influenced by the large number of maritime borders, and by the fact that most territorial disputes are in the maritime environment. This requires different ways of managing security cooperation than in largely land-based environments.

Fourth, there is no pervasive ideological force which predisposes the Asia Pacific to systemic conflict. For example, there is no equivalent to the nationalism and irredentism which helped drive the European imperial system into conflict in World War I, and which still echoes in Bosnia.

Fifth, East Asian governments have somewhat different attitudes to international conduct. They tend to have a preference for informal decision-making, for oral commitments, and for leaving differences unresolved where there is no urgent need to reach a conclusion.

This has the positive effect of quarantining many differences - like the many territorial and boundary disputes in the region.

But it also means that the region is relatively unpractised in managing differences that have become urgent - which is something it may increasingly need to do in coming years as the economic implications of territorial disputes become more pressing.

Sixth and finally, the presence of the United States acts in the Asia Pacific as a moderator of potential conflict. Unlike in the former European central balance, or during the Vietnam War era in Asia, the US is now not a party to an adversarial system.

In the post-Cold War era its alliances are not directed at an adversary - they function to secure the US presence and commitment.

Its presence strengthens regional countries' confidence in their security - in effect taking most issues of potential conflict off the agenda. This is most obvious in North East Asia, where for example Japan and South Korea have not only refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons but have also undertaken legal obligations never to acquire them.

These six factors are important assets for continuing stability in the Asia Pacific. But growing defence capabilities, and the increasing economic significance of some territorial disputes, mean that regional governments need to apply them to the task of helping to manage the evolution of the new architecture.

That is what they are doing.

2.2 The Evolving Asia Pacific Architecture

The evolution of the new architecture will continue for some time. Its future shape is not yet settled, but it is possible to see a pattern emerging.

That pattern combines bilateral, sub-regional and region-wide linkages - some formal, some informal - in a growing web of relationships. All three levels are mutually reinforcing. All contribute to what I see as the core task: building a sense of trust, a sense of shared interests and a sense of shared responsibility for the region's future.

The Bilateral Level

At the bilateral level, there is growing acceptance that strong, confident relationships provide an underpinning for regional stability and effective multilateral activity.

Australia sees its alliance with the United States in that light, as do others who have such alliances.

Australia has been building a dense and wide-ranging set of linkages at this level - under the rubric of "practical bilateralism" - through ANZUS, the Agreement on Maintaining Security with Indonesia, the Joint Declaration with Papua New Guinea, and Closer Defence Relations with New Zealand.

The Five Power Defence Arrangements, which include the UK, Malaysia, Singapore and New Zealand, provide for similar cooperation at a sub-regional level.

In addition to these more formal linkages, Australia has a range of less formal - but strong and growing - bilateral defence and security ties with other South East Asian countries, including semi-official security talks with Vietnam.

Australia is also strengthening its bilateral links with North East Asian countries.

This year we have begun officials-level political-military talks with Korea and Japan; and last month I reached agreement in Beijing with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on holding official regional security discussions.

It is of course essential to involve military elites in this process, and Australia has developed regular dialogue and cooperation with regional defence forces. The Chief of the Defence Force, General Baker, will for example visit China later this month.

The bilateral relations that contribute most to shaping the regional environment are clearly those between the major powers.

Building on existing alliances is an important contribution.

Australia welcomed the Joint Declaration signed by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto in April as a revitalisation of the commitment to the US-Japan Security Agreement.

In July, Australia itself gave new vigour to its alliance with the United States through the AUSMIN Joint Declaration, the focus of which was very much on the contribution the alliance makes to regional security.

It is equally important to strengthen non-alliance relationships, for instance between the United States and China, because integration of all regional countries in a shared security system is the best assurance of regional stability.

The Regional Level

What is happening at the bilateral level is familiar enough in a European context. Where the Asia Pacific becomes unique is in the way in which its regional institutions are developing.

The ASEAN Regional Forum, or ARF, operates in a way which contrasts markedly with the highly structured negotiations and institutions typical of Europe. It is characterised by minimal institutionalisation, consensus decision-making, an evolutionary approach to objectives, frequent consultations at many levels, and the use of non-government discussions (or what is called the second track) to pioneer new subjects.

Nevertheless, the ARF works, and it has agreed to approach security cooperation in three stages: confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and the elaboration of approaches to conflicts.

The first stage of its activities, trust-building or mutual reassurance, is maturing as a useful mechanism for developing a sense of shared strategic interest. It has established a region-wide security dialogue, including sensitive issues like Burma, the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The second stage, preventive diplomacy, is showing promise. At the third ARF in July, for example, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, used his good offices as Chairman to convey ARF members' concerns about the situation in Burma to the Burmese Foreign Minister. I am proud to say that Australia played an instrumental role in this initiative.

Below the Ministerial level, the ARF has a crowded program of inter-sessional meetings, which are now developing practical, cooperative measures.

The first results are annual defence policy statements and the increased publication of defence white papers. They are of variable quality, but are reinforcing transparency and openness in a region where that is not the traditional culture of state policy.

Military exchanges, including staff college training, are increasing and ARF members are beginning to look positively at notification of military exercises and at sending observers to them.

Measures, like defence white papers, that increase transparency will be important in ensuring that increased arms purchases do not lead to arms races. They will help strengthen regional trust so that the increased defence capabilities that come with economic growth are not seen as a evidence of hostile intent.

Future of the ARF

Successes with the stages of trust-building and preventive diplomacy may lead in future to an agreed approach to the third stage - perhaps to the resolution of disputes through agreed mechanisms. How and when that could happen is not clear, but I would point out that the ARF has already produced positive results through what is becoming an established pattern of effective diplomacy.

For instance the ARF has contributed to lowered temperatures over South China Sea territorial issues, which have now become a normal matter for discussion. Meanwhile, China and ASEAN claimants have agreed to freeze their activities in the South China Sea and to step up their diplomatic contacts.

In North East Asia, the ARF has been supportive of a more positive climate on the Korean Peninsula. The Four Party Peace Proposal - involving the two Koreas, China and the United States - presently offers the most effective way forward.

The best form of further support the international community can give is to help fund the Korean Energy Development Organization, thereby helping to ensure that North Korea's nuclear program is used for exclusively peaceful purposes. A substantial, multi-year contribution from the European Union will be very important.

Observers brought up in the tradition of European statecraft sometimes object that the value of the ARF is questionable because it is not able to resolve conflicts and regulate security affairs.

My answer is that the ARF was never conceived as the sole answer to managing security in the Asia Pacific. As with the South China Sea, the ARF is about adding a new regional layer to security relationships that will work together with management at the bilateral level.

It is not the intention of Australia or its ARF partners that the Forum become a collective defence arrangement. It is born out of the idea of defence with others, not defence against others. That idea makes practical sense in a region where the security dilemma is generally less pressing than in recent European history.

As I noted earlier, however, regional changes like increasing defence capabilities will modify that situation. The ARF therefore needs to use the present favourable period to develop regional dialogue further on issues like defence planning and acquisition, and it should take forward the agenda on preventive diplomacy.

Other Regional Processes

Though they are not security forums, APEC and other regional processes reinforce what the ARF does. APEC makes a direct contribution by strengthening a liberal economic environment that will sustain East Asian growth.

Inevitably, too, APEC Leaders will informally - at least bilaterally - discuss topical regional tensions at their annual meeting. The habit of consultation and the personal relationships that result from those meetings will strengthen regional trust.

One issue that remains to be explored is how to create a more effective process for regional exchanges between defence authorities. We are already seeing active participation by defence officials in ARF inter-sessional meetings, and Japan is hosting an Informal Forum for Defence Authorities in the Asia Pacific Region next month in order to promote the ARF to defence practitioners.

It makes sense to look towards an inclusive meeting of regional Defence Ministers at some stage in the future.

PART THREE: WHAT EUROPE CAN CONTRIBUTE

As Asia Pacific countries work towards shaping a new security environment, it will obviously make good sense to investigate where the European experience has relevance.

Australia recognises that Europe has major interests in Asia Pacific stability and continued economic growth - just as Asia Pacific countries have in Europe.

It is in the interests of both regions to build connections, which is why Australia has welcomed the establishment of the Asia Europe Meeting process. As you will be aware, Australia is interested in contributing to that process. I believe that Australia's very extensive links with East Asia are a distinctive asset: our perceptions, interests and experience can add value to the discussions.

For similar reasons, Europe has the potential to help develop the new Asia Pacific security structure. European countries have a wealth of experience in confidence-building and preventive diplomacy, and the ARF needs to examine how far it can be adapted in the Asia Pacific context.

Australia appreciates, too, the contribution that Europe has made to the international disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. That is why my Government sees value in the second-track seminars that France and Germany on behalf of the EU are sponsoring later this year on preventive diplomacy and non-proliferation. Australia will be joining Indonesia and Germany as co-hosts of the non-proliferation seminar.

Conclusion

Everything I have said this afternoon goes back to the point that shaping the Asia Pacific regional security environment is an unprecedented opportunity to build long-term security.

It requires a foundation of trust, and a willingness to be creative.

It requires balancing the step-by-step approach favoured by those in the region, with a determination to carry through practical measures in the time allowed by the present favourable situation.

It requires policy-makers to keep in mind that the Asia Pacific does face different realities from those in Europe, and that this means the security architecture will evolve somewhat differently.

It must emphasise consensus and it will probably be less formalised than European structures.

It would be foolish to speculate in detail on what the structure might look like, because the region is exploring new territory.

But what I can say with confidence is that Australia is keen to draw on European experience and I am sure your Institute will be in the forefront of the exciting intellectual task of adapting European experience to Asia Pacific realities.