Iraq Intelligence

Today's un-sourced Sydney Morning Herald story alleges the government was "warned repeatedly by intelligence analysts before the Iraq war that the conflict would harm the war on terrorism by fanning Islamic extremism and spurring terrorist recruiting".

Any implication the Government concealed warnings from the public is wrong.

Any information the Australian Government received before March 19, 2003, or since, identifying an increased threat from terrorism has been reflected in Government warnings and travel advisories.

In the lead up to the military conflict a number of travel advisories, particularly for Middle Eastern countries, were upgraded.

ASIO has not adjusted its overall assessment of the terrorist threat to Australia since shortly after September 11 2001, long before the Iraq war.

Both the Jull Committee and the Flood Report comprehensively reviewed pre-war intelligence and neither concluded that the Government misled the Australian public about that intelligence.

Our intelligence agencies and partners, diplomatic cables and media reporting all provided a vast volume of assessment material before the war against Saddam Hussein's regime. The Government, not any agencies, had to make a decision.

In the end, we were faced with a fundamental strategic choice: to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime which had manufactured and used Weapons of Mass Destruction, or to withdraw in ignominy, granting Saddam a massive strategic victory.

To have done the latter would have had profound implications for the security of the Middle East and the broader international community.

To grant a strategic victory of those dimensions to a dictator who actively supported terrorism would have been unwise.

Media inquiries: Chris Kenny (Ministerial) 02 6277 7500 - Julie McDonald (DFAT) 02 6261 1555